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Labor Market Impacts of Policies 
to Expand Access to Health Care
Stephen A, Woodbury 
Andrew J. Hogan
Michigan State University
In the United States, private health insurance coverage is closely tied 
to employment most individuals who are covered by private health 
insurance receive it either as part of their compensation for employ 
ment or through a family member who receives it as part of his or her 
compensation. As a result, policies designed to alter health care provi 
sion may have the side effect of influencing labor markets. That is, 
policy-induced changes in the health care system can be expected to 
alter the mix of employment, total employment, and wages.
This paper examines how various policies intended to expand health 
insurance coverage in a state may also affect that state's labor market. 
The first section of the paper provides background data on the U.S. 
labor market; it explores the relationships among hourly wages, inclu 
sion in an employer-provided group health plan, and coverage by any 
form of health insurance. Also provided are data on wages and health 
insurance coverage by industry. The second section of the paper develops 
the linkages between changes in health care policy and changes in wages 
and employment. Although we offer predictions about the qualitative 
impact of the policies (that is, directions of the policies' impacts on 
the labor market), we are reluctant to make precise quantitative predic 
tions because little of the empirical work needed to offer quantitative 
estimates of wage and employment impacts has been performed.
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The Labor Market and Health Insurance
Table 1 shows the distribution of hourly wage and salary earnings 
in the United States in 1988 (see the first two columns). The figures 
show that nearly 2.7 million workers earned less than the minimum 
wage of $3.35 in 1988, and that another 6.8 million earned from $3.35 
to $4.00 an hour. (Hourly earnings below the minimum wage are possible 
because of incomplete coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
because of imperfect compliance with the Act.) It follows that nearly 
9.5 million workers or about 11 percent of all wage and salary workers 
in the United States had earnings near or below the minimum wage 
in 1988.
Table 1 also shows that an additional 8.3 million workers had hourly 
earnings of $4.01 to $5.00 in 1988. If we characterize all workers with 
earnings at or below $5.00 per hour as low-wage, then a total of 17.8 
million workers in 1988 or over 20 percent of all wage and salary 
workers in the United States would be characterized as low-wage.
Table 1 also shows that the inclusion of workers in employer-provided 
group health insurance plans is strongly correlated with hourly earn 
ings (see the columns headed "Included in Group Health Plan"). 
Workers whose hourly earnings were $5.00 or less were far less likely 
to be included in an employer-provided health insurance plan than were 
workers whose hourly earnings were above $5.00. Only about 13 per 
cent of workers with hourly earnings below $3.35 were included in an 
employer-provided health insurance plan, whereas nearly 88 percent 
of workers with hourly earnings over $15.00 were included.
Finally, Table 1 shows that even though low-wage workers are far 
less likely than high-wage workers to be included in employer-provided 
health insurance plans, they are only slightly less likely than high-wage 
workers to be covered by any form of health insurance (see columns 
headed "Covered by Any Health Insurance"). Low-wage workers  
those earning $5.00 or less per hour had roughly an 80 percent prob 
ability of being covered by any form of health insurance, whereas 
workers earning over $5.00 per hour had better than a 90 percent prob 
ability of being covered. The difference between the percentages of
Table 1
Inclusion of U.S. Workers in Group Health Plans, 
by Hourly Wage and Salary Earnings, 1988




































































NOTES: Figures displayed are authors' tabulations from the May 1988 Current Population Survey. The sample includes wage and salary workers who 
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low-wage and high-wage workers who are covered by any health in 
surance is far less than the difference between the percentages of low- 
wage and high-wage workers who are included in an employer-provided 
group health plan. The reason is that most low-wage workers are either 
covered by a public program or are part of a family in which someone 
else's health insurance extends to the low-wage workers.
Table 1 suggests the importance of designing health care access policies 
that target the uninsured. In particular, the figures suggest that policies 
designed to include more workers as the primary insured in employer- 
provided health plans are less likely to target uninsured individuals than 
are policies that act directly to cover uninsured individuals. The reason 
is simply that most individuals who work in the labor market are, 
regardless of their hourly earnings, covered by some form of health 
insurance. Including more workers as the primary insured in employer- 
provided group health plans would result in the addition (as primary 
insureds) of many workers who are already covered by some form of 
health insurance.
In Table 2, the same sample of workers is broken down by industry 
of employment. The first two columns show that by far the largest sec 
tors of the economy are professional and related services, retail trade, 
and durable goods manufacturing. The column labeled "Included in 
Group Health Plan" shows that there is much interindustry variation 
in the percentage of workers who are included in employer-provided 
health plans. In several industries, more than 70 percent of all workers 
were included in employer-provided group health plans: mining, durable 
and nondurable goods manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, 
finance, and public administration. But in other industries agriculture, 
retail trade, and personal services only about 30 to 40 percent of all 
workers were included. It follows that policies to expand the inclusion 
of workers in employer-provided health plans would probably have an 
uneven impact, affecting mainly industries in which health insurance 
provision tends to be low.
Although there is much industry-to-industry variation in the percent 
age of workers included in employer-provided health plans, Table 2 
also shows that there is far less industry-to-industry variation in the 
percentage of workers who are covered by any health insurance (see
Table 2
Inclusion of U.S. Wage and Salary Workers 











Finance, insurance, real estate
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment and recreation services


































































































NOTES: Figures displayed are authors' tabulations from the May 1988 Current Population Survey. The sample includes wage and salary workers who 
responded to the May Employee Benefits Supplement and reported information about occupation and industry of employment. Military and self-employed 
workers are excluded.
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columns labeled "Covered by Any Health Insurance"). Only in 
agriculture is the percentage of workers covered by any health insurance 
less than 80 percent, and in the four largest industries, the percentage 
of workers covered is 88 percent or greater. Again, it appears that most 
workers who are not included in an employer-provided health plan are 
covered nevertheless by some form of health insurance.
Table 3 shows the distribution of wages within each of the major in 
dustries in the United States in 1988. The table shows both the number 
and percentage of workers in each industry whose hourly wage and salary 
earnings were under $5.01, from $5.01 to $10.00, and over $10.00. 
In three industries agriculture, personal services, and retail trade at 
least 45 percent of all workers had hourly wage and salary earnings 
under $5.01 in 1988. At the high end of the wage scale were mining, 
durable goods manufacturing, transportation, and public administration. 
In all of these industries, at least half of all workers had hourly earn 
ings over $10.00 in 1988.
Together, Tables 2 and 3 show that industries that tend to pay high 
wages also tend to include a high proportion of their workers in 
employer-provided group health plans. This apparent link between wages 
and employer-provision of health insurance suggests that high- 
productivity workers are highly compensated with both wage and non- 
wage benefits. This link bears implications for how changes in health 
care policy will affect different industries and groups of workers.
Labor Market Analysis of the Policies
Conventional labor market analysis can provide insights into how 
various policies to expand health insurance coverage might influence 
wages and employment. The strategy here is as follows. First, we set 
out a general labor market model that can be used to analyze the im 
pact of various policies on the labor market outcomes that are of greatest 
concern: wages and employment. The model involves specifying two 
sets of factors: those influencing the quantity of labor that workers are 
willing to supply to a given labor market, and those influencing the quan 
tity of labor that employers will demand from that same labor market.
Table 3
Distribution of U.S. Hourly Wage and Salary Earnings 
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214 Labor Market Impacts of Policies
Next, we define what we mean by a labor market and discuss the ap 
plication of the model to the various policies that are of interest. Final 
ly, we use the model to analyze in a general qualitative way the im 
plications of the policies for labor markets. We plan in future work to 
derive quantitative estimates of how large the predicted effects would be.
The Model
In general, both economic theory and a significant body of empirical 
work suggest that the amount of labor willingly supplied to a given labor 
market [or labor supply to market /, LS/] will depend on five influences: 
(1) hourly wage and salary earnings paid in that labor market [w/]; (2) 
taxes paid by workers on their earnings [t] ; (3) nonwage characteristics 
of work in that labor market [n/], including the safety and desirability 
of the work, and the provision of health and pension benefits by the 
employer; (4) the ease or difficulty of gaining entry to the labor market 
[ei\ due, for example, to educational of licensing requirements; and (5) 
opportunities (including earnings) available to workers in other pur 
suits and other labor markets [w;]. These considerations can be sum 
marized compactly as a labor supply function, which shows the quanti 
ty of labor supplied to labor market / as a function of the factors just 
described:
LSi = LSi(\vi; t, HI, ej, wj).
The relationship between the quantity of labor supplied to labor market 
i and the wage in that market can be summarized as a labor supply curve 
(see Figure 1), which shows that as the wage in labor market / increases, 
more workers are willing to supply labor to this market, other things 
equal. Changes in the other factors in the labor supply function [t, n^, 
ei, and wj\ can be shown graphically as shifts of the LS; curve. 1
The amount of labor that employers demand from labor market / [LD/] 
will depend on the following factors: (1) hourly wage and salary earn 
ings paid in that labor market \wj\\ (2) nonwage costs of employing 
workers from that labor market [c{\, including training costs, costs of 
complying with safety regulations, and legally required payroll taxes 
for social security, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensa 
tion; (3) prices of other inputs into production [p;], including capital
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Figure 1
Effects of Universal Health Insurance 
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costs and the total cost of employing other kinds of labor; (4) the quan 
tity of output [q] desired by the employer, which may depend in turn 
on market conditions and current output prices; and (5) the technology 
of production or organization of the production process [g]. These con 
siderations can be summarized as a labor demand function, which shows 
the quantity of labor demanded in labor market i as a function of the 
factors just described:
LDt = LDi(wi; cit pj, q, g).
The relationship between the quantity of labor demanded from labor 
market i and the wage in that market can be summarized as a labor 
demand curve (see Figure 1), which shows that as the wage in labor 
market / increases, employers will demand less labor from this market, 
other things equal. Changes in the other factors in the labor demand 
function [q, pj, q, and g] can be shown graphically as shifts of the LD/ 
curve.
Applying the Model
The labor market model developed above can be applied to a wide 
variety of problems. Here we are interested in the labor market im 
pacts of the following policies designed to expand access to health care: 
(1) universal health insurance managed by the state (chapter 3 in this 
volume); (2) mandatory employer-provided health insurance, coupled 
with a public sponsor for those not covered by employer-provided health 
insurance (chapter 4 in this volume; Mitchell 1989); and (3) a Small 
Employer Health Insurance Pool, coupled with Medicaid Buy-In pro 
grams for the unemployed uninsured and not-in-the-labor-force un 
insured (chapters 5.2 and 5.3 in this volume).
We examine the impacts of these policies on two representative labor 
markets: "low-wage" and "higher-wage." The key assumption we will 
make about these two labor markets is that workers in low-wage labor 
markets do not currently receive employer-provided health insurance 
(although they may as a result of policy changes), whereas workers in 
higher-wage labor markets do. This assumption simplifies the analysis, 
and is roughly consistent with the empirical findings reported on low- 
and higher-wage workers. 2
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In addition, it should be understood that low-wage labor markets in 
clude a disproportionate number of relatively young workers, minorities, 
and women, whereas higher-wage labor markets include a dispropor 
tionate number of workers aged 25 to 54 who are male. In the labor 
economics literature, low-wage labor markets are frequently referred 
to as "low-skill" or "unskilled" labor markets, whereas higher-wage 
labor markets are referred to as "skilled." These characterizations are 
intended to be descriptive rather than normative, and there is clearly 
a whole range of labor markets in between these two types. 3
Universal Health Insurance
The provision of a specified package of health care services by a single 
provider to all individuals, regardless of their income or employment 
status, is universal health insurance. Universal health insurance has 
become increasingly attractive in recent years because it has the poten 
tial both to eliminate incomplete coverage and to bring health care costs 
under control (chapter 3 in this volume). In view of the possibility that 
some type of universal plan will be adopted in the future, it is impor 
tant to understand the labor market effects of such a policy.
Special Assumptions
To analyze the effects of universal health insurance, we adopt the 
following assumptions. First, we assume that the universal health plan 
is financed through an increase in personal income tax rates. (If the 
universal health plan were state-managed, this would imply an increase 
in state personal income tax rates; if federally managed, it would imply 
an increase in federal tax rates.)
Second, we assume that the universal health plan will provide health 
care more efficiently than the current system, in that the total amount 
of health care provided will increase, but the total resources spent on 
health care will remain constant. This assumption is one reasonable 
benchmark, based on the argument that a universal, state-managed, 
health plan would eliminate administrative and other inefficiencies that 
are inherent in the current system (see chapter 3 for further discussion).
Third, we assume that workers who are already covered by health 
insurance will receive health care under a universal plan that is similar
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to the health care they now receive under their employer-provided plans. 
The implication of the second and third assumptions is that everyone 
who is currently covered by health insurance will receive equally good 
care under the universal plan, and further that individuals who are cur 
rently uninsured will receive health care that they would not receive 
under the current system.
Effects on Low-Wage Labor Markets
The effect of universal health insurance on the supply of low-wage 
workers is essentially a tax effect. That is, low-wage workers will ex 
perience a tax increase that reduces their hourly after-tax earnings. It 
follows that they will reduce the number of hours they are willing to 
work at a given before-tax wage (we show this tax effect in Figure 1 
by a leftward shift of the labor supply curve from LS to LS7)- 4
There would be no effect of the universal plan on the demand for 
low-wage workers, because we assume that low-wage employers do 
not currently provide health insurance. As a result, the equilibrium wage 
in low-wage labor markets would rise, and employment would fall, in 
response to universal health insurance (see Figure 1). The magnitude 
of these changes is potentially large, because low-wage workers tend 
to show a relatively large labor supply response to changes in the real 
(after-tax) wage. 5
Effects on Higher-Wage Labor Markets
The effects of universal health insurance on higher-wage labor markets 
are more complex. Consider first the effect of a universal plan on the 
supply of higher-wage labor. The tax effect would again apply higher- 
wage workers will experience a tax increase that would reduce the 
number of hours they are willing to work at a given before-tax wage. 
We would expect this tax effect to be smaller than the tax effect for 
low-wage workers, because empirical evidence shows that the labor 
supply of higher-wage workers tends to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in the real wage. Accordingly, we show the tax effect by a 
small shift of the supply curve, from LS to LS' in Figure 2. 6
In addition to the tax effect, there will be a loss-of-beneflt effect on 
the labor supply of high-wage workers. Universal health insurance
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Figure 2
Effects of Universal Health Insurance 
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would essentially sever the link between employment and the availability 
of health insurance. As a result, individuals would no longer need to 
be employed in order to receive health insurance, and an important non- 
wage aspect of employment would be eliminated. It follows that labor 
supply would be further reduced (see the shift from LS' to LS" in Figure 
2). 7
Consider now the effect of a universal plan on the demand for higher- 
wage workers. Because higher-wage employers currently provide health 
insurance, the adoption of universal health insurance could have a large 
impact on nonwage labor costs of higher-wage employers it would 
eliminate the need to pay directly for employees' health insurance. As 
a result, the demand for higher-wage workers would increase (see the 
shift from LD to LD' in Figure 2).
Given the assumptions we have made, the increase in labor demand 
would be in proportion to the decrease in labor supply induced by the 
loss-of-benefit effect. It follows that, absent the tax effect on labor supply, 
the equilibrium wage would rise by exactly enough to offset the reduc 
tion in employers' nonwage labor costs, and equilibrium employment 
would be unchanged. But when we add the tax effect, the equilibrium 
wage increases by more than enough to offset the loss of benefit; as 
a result, equilibrium employment falls (see Figure 2). Hence, the model 
does not predict a reduction of total labor costs following adoption of 
universal health insurance, as some employers appear to expect. On 
the contrary, the model suggests that total labor costs would rise 
somewhat, and that employment would fall, in both higher-wage and 
low-wage labor markets.
Effects if Efficiency Gains Were Small
It is also important to consider how violations of the second and third 
assumptions made above would change our predictions. That is, what 
would happen if the efficiency gains from the universal health plan were 
small, so that even though the total resources devoted to health care 
would be unchanged, the process of expanding coverage to all individuals 
reduced average access to health care? In this case, employers would 
still be relieved of the direct burden of health insurance premiums, and 
the tax effect on labor supply would still occur. But the loss-of-benefit
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effect would be blunted because individuals would have an incentive 
to work so as to pay for additional health care or insurance coverage 
(in order to receive access and coverage comparable to what they had 
received before). As a result, the decrease in labor supply would be 
less, the increase in the equilibrium wage would be less, and the decrease 
in employment would be less than shown in Figure 2.
Summary
The most likely effects of universal health insurance on low-wage 
labor markets are higher before-tax wages, higher total labor costs, and 
lower employment. The analysis of higher-wage labor markets is more 
complicated, but the results are similar: higher before-tax wages (and 
higher total labor costs) and lower employment. Our predictions do not 
appear to be sensitive to the assumptions we have made. Nevertheless, 
we would emphasize that our conclusions are qualitative, not quantitative, 
and that the empirical research needed to make quantitative predictions 
about the effects of universal health insurance on labor markets has not 
been performed. Filling this gap in the empirical work on labor markets 
should have a high place on the research agenda.
Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance
In view of its adoption in Hawaii and Massachusetts, mandating has 
taken on considerable importance as a policy option. Most proposals 
to require employers to provide health insurance to their workers are 
coupled with creation of a public program that would sponsor health 
insurance for anyone who remained uncovered by mandatory employer- 
provided health insurance. Accordingly, we consider mandating and 
the public sponsor in tandem.
Mandating is highly controversial, in part because of its potential im 
pact on labor markets. Curiously though, there is broad agreement among 
labor economists on the general qualitative impact of mandating on labor 
markets (see Mitchell 1989 for a review). The direct effects of man 
dating are on low-wage labor markets in which health benefits are not 
currently provided. There would be two kinds of direct effect. First, 
to an employer who does not now provide health benefits, the man 
dating of benefits connotes an increase in the nonwage costs of employing
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labor [c/]. This would lead to a reduced demand for labor (in Figure 
3, a leftward shift of the demand curve from LD to LD'}. Second, the 
availability of health benefits from low-wage employment where none 
had been available before could lead a greater number of potential low- 
wage workers to actually offer their services in the low-wage labor 
market. This implies an increased supply of low-wage labor. (In Figure 
3, we show a rightward shift of the supply curve from LS to LS'—that 
is relatively small.) 8
In a labor market where there is no effective minimum wage, the 
outcome is a reduced wage and a likely decrease in employment. (In 
Figure 3, the wage falls from w0 to wlt and employment falls from L0 
to Ll .)9 But if an effective wage floor exists in the low-wage labor market, 
the wage cannot adjust downward. This would occur in the presence 
of an effective minimum wage, in which case the wage would remain 
constant, but employment in the low-wage labor market would fall by 
more than it would if the wage could adjust downward. (In Figure 3, 
if w0 is the wage floor, then employment falls from L0 to L2 . The dif 
ference between L0 and L2 can be interpreted as the number of workers 
displaced from this labor market.)
The impact of mandating on higher-wage labor markets would be more 
subtle, but there are two possible effects. First, mandating would in 
crease the demand for higher-wage workers to the degree that it in 
creased the cost of employing low-wage workers. That is, the higher 
cost of low-wage labor would induce employers to substitute higher- 
wage (skilled) workers for low-wage (less-skilled) workers. 10 It follows 
that the increase in demand for high-wage workers will be greater, the 
more inflexible are wages in the low-wage labor market (since the total 
cost of employing low-wage workers rises more when wages cannot 
adjust downward). We show the impact of mandating on the demand 
for higher-wage workers by a shift of the demand curve from LD to 
LD' in Figure 4. Second, the public sponsor component of mandating 
could have an impact on the supply of higher-wage labor by providing 
workers with a relatively low-cost means of obtaining health insurance 
without being employed. For example, the availability of low-cost public 
health insurance might increase the likelihood that a worker consider 
ing early retirement would actually retire. If so, then the supply of higher-
Labor Market Impacts of Policies 223
Figure 3
Effects of Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
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Figure 4
Effects of Mandatory Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
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wage workers would fall under mandating with a public sponsor. (See 
the shift from LD to LD' in Figure 4. We show this as a small shift 
on the assumption that the labor supply effect of the public sponsor would 
not be great.) It follows that mandatory employer-provided health in 
surance (with a public sponsor) would lead to both increased wages and 
increased employment in higher-wage labor markets (see Figure 4). 
Although economists agree on the qualitative impacts of mandating, 
there exists no work that offers quantitative estimates of the labor market 
impacts of mandated health benefits. We urge that high priority be given 
to obtaining such estimates.
Voluntary Programs to Improve Access to Health Care
Elsewhere in this volume we have explored two so-called voluntary 
programs to improve access to health care: the Small Employer Health 
Insurance Pool and Medicaid Buy-In programs for the unemployed and 
not-in-the-labor-force uninsured. Because a voluntary approach to im 
proving access to health care would involve adoption of both of these 
programs, it is useful to examine their labor-market effects in tandem.
The Small Employer Health Insurance Pool would reduce the cost 
of providing health insurance for some employers mainly small 
employers of low-wage workers. Specifically, employers who do not 
now provide health insurance (because their workers are either high- 
risk or low-productivity) would find the cost of providing health in 
surance reduced for two reasons. First, creating a pool within which 
risk could be shared would reduce the premiums needed to provide a 
given level of health benefits. Second, the policy is designed so that 
the employer's cost of health insurance is subsidized if the total cost 
of health benefits exceeds 4 percent of payroll. In effect, the Small 
Employer Pool would provide a subsidy to employment of low-wage 
labor by reducing an important nonwage cost of employing low-wage 
workers (q, in terms of our model). Accordingly, the Small Employer 
Pool would increase demand for low-wage labor (in Figure 5, LD shifts 
to LD').
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Figure 5
Effects of Voluntary Programs
(Small Employer Health-Insurance Pool and Medicaid Buy-In Program) 
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The Small Employer Pool (by itself) would also tend to increase the 
supply of low-wage labor. The reason is that the existence of health 
insurance benefits in low-wage jobs that previously offered no benefits 
would induce more workers to seek work in the low-wage labor market. 
(In terms-of our model, a nonwage characteristic of working in labor 
market i, n/, would be improved.) 11
However, the positive effect of the Small Employer Pool on low-wage 
labor supply would probably be offset by the Medicaid Buy-In programs 
that would also be part of a voluntary approach. Since the Medicaid 
Buy-In programs would allow individuals who are without employment 
or health insurance to buy a comprehensive package of health benefits 
(usually at subsidized rates), they would provide an income subsidy for 
the purchase of health insurance. Such a subsidy implies an improve 
ment in the opportunities available to workers outside of the low-wage 
labor market (that is, a change in Wj in our model). Accordingly, the 
Buy-In programs would tend to reduce labor supply to low-wage labor 
markets. The magnitude of this supply effect would be larger the more 
generous is the subsidy and the larger is the share of health insurance 
in low-wage workers' total consumption.
Since the labor supply effects of the Small Employer Pool and the 
Medicaid Buy-In programs would offset each other, the voluntary pro 
grams would have no (or only a very small) effect on labor supply. 
It follows that the main impact of the voluntary programs on low-wage 
labor markets would be to increase labor demand, which in turn im 
plies higher wages and increased employment of low-wage workers (see 
Figure 5).
Whereas the voluntary programs would have a direct impact on low- 
wage labor markets, their impact on higher-wage labor markets would 
be indirect. Consider first the impact of the Small Employer Pool on 
labor supply to higher-wage labor markets. Because the compensation 
package in low-wage labor markets would improve as a result of the 
Small Employer Pool (compensation now includes health insurance in 
addition to wages), fewer workers would offer their labor in higher- 
wage labor markets. Most likely, this would occur at the margin, as 
prospective workers leave school and choose jobs and career paths. It 
follows that the supply of labor to higher-wage labor markets would 
fall (see the shift from LS to LS' in Figure 6).
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Figure 6
Effects of Voluntary Programs
(Small Employer Health-Insurance Pool and Medicaid Buy-In Programs) 
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The Small Employer Pool would also influence the demand for higher- 
wage labor. Because it provides a subsidy to employment of low-wage 
labor, the Small Employer Pool would induce employers to substitute 
low-wage for higher-wage workers. As already noted, this implies that 
the demand for low-wage workers would increase, but it also implies 
that the demand for higher-wage labor would fall (see the shift from 
LD to LD1 in Figure 6).
We believe that the Medicaid Buy-In programs would have only a 
negligible impact on higher-wage labor markets. Accordingly, the im 
pact of the Small Employer Pool on the higher-wage labor market also 
constitutes the total effect of the voluntary programs on that market. 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the voluntary programs would tend to reduce 
employment of higher-wage workers, and would have little if any im 
pact on the wage.
Summary and Conclusions
Because private health insurance coverage is closely tied to employ 
ment, policies that are intended to expand the coverage of health in 
surance can also be expected to have side effects on the labor market. 
This paper offers both a characterization of the U.S. labor market with 
an eye to the role of employer-provided health insurance, and a sketch 
of the theoretical linkages between health policy and the labor market.
The main findings from the statistics we set out in the first section 
can be summarized as follows.
(1) Roughly 20 percent of all individuals in the United States who 
worked during 1988 were low-wage workers, earning $5.00 per hour 
or less (see Table 1). Only 27 percent of these low-wage workers were 
included in employer-provided group health insurance plans. But 82 
percent of these same workers were covered by some form of health 
insurance. Two points follow from this finding. First, there is far more 
variation in the degree to which workers are included in employer- 
provided group health plans than in the degree to which they are covered 
by health insurance. Second, policies designed to include more workers 
as the primary insured in employer-provided health plans are less likely
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to cover uninsured individuals than are policies that act directly to cover 
uninsured individuals.
(2) There is much variation from industry to industry in the inclu 
sion of workers in group health plans. Higher-wage industries tend to 
provide health insurance to a high proportion of their workers, whereas 
low-wage industries tend to provide health insurance to a relatively low 
proportion of their workers (see Tables 2 and 3). It follows that policies 
to expand the inclusion of workers in employer-provided health insurance 
plans would have an uneven impact, affecting low-wage industries more 
than others.
We set out a standard model of the labor market that offers predic 
tions about the effects of three policies to improve access to health care. 
The predictions of the model can be summarized as follows.
(1) Universal health insurance would lead to increased before-tax 
wages paid to workers, increased total labor costs to employers, and 
lower employment in both low-wage and higher-wage labor markets. 
In particular, the belief that universal health insurance would reduce 
labor costs of employers is not supported by our model.
(2) There is considerable agreement among labor economists regard 
ing the probable effects of mandatory employer-provided health in 
surance on the low-wage labor market. In the absence of an effective 
wage floor (or minimum wage), wages would fall and employment would 
fall somewhat in response to mandating. But in the presence of an ef 
fective minimum wage, total costs of employing low-wage labor would 
rise substantially, and employment of low-wage labor would fall by more 
than if wages could adjust downward. The increase in total cost of 
employing low-wage labor would in turn induce employers to substitute 
higher-wage (skilled) labor for low-wage (less-skilled) labor, and wages 
and employment in higher-wage labor markets would rise in the long run.
(3) Finally, we considered two voluntary programs to improve ac 
cess to health care: the Small Employer Health Insurance Pool and 
Medicaid Buy-In programs for the unemployed and not-in-the-labor- 
force uninsured. The most important predicted effect of the voluntary 
programs is an increase in employment, wages, and total compensa 
tion in low-wage labor markets. This suggests that the voluntary pro 
grams would unambiguously improve the welfare of low-wage workers.
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It also seems likely that employment would fall in higher-wage labor 
markets, although wages would be affected minimally if at all. Since 
any contraction of higher-wage labor markets would take place over 
a long period of time, and would result mainly from workers' choices 
stemming from improved opportunities in the low-wage labor market, 
we conclude that this contraction would be rather benign from the stand 
point of workers' welfare.
NOTES
1. We separate the wage from the other factors in the supply function by a semicolon in order 
to distinguish factors that result in movements along the supply curve from factors that shift the 
supply curve.
2. In fact, some low-wage workers do receive health insurance, and some higher-wage workers 
do not. Our assumptions are made for analytical clarity.
3. See Dickens and Lang (1985) on the appropriateness of dividing the labor market into two sectors.
4. It is also possible that universal health insurance would have an income effect on the supply 
of low-wage workers The reason is that some low-wage workers currently use part of their earn 
ings to buy nongroup coverage, but universal insurance would eliminate the need for private pur 
chase of health insurance. As a result, universal health insurance would be like an increase in 
income to these low-wage workers. The result would be a further reduction of labor supply.
5. Good summaries of the empirical work on labor supply responses to real wage changes include 
Keeley (1981) and Killingsworth (1983)
6. Two factors could make the tax effect larger, however First, the effect would be greater if 
households were pushed into higher tax brackets by the increased taxable earnings that result from 
severing the link between employment and health insurance (see the discussion of the loss-of- 
benefit effect below). Second, the wage elasticity of labor supply for higher-wage workers could 
increase if health insurance were no longer linked to employment (Currently, benefits are usual 
ly provided only to workers who work close to full time, so that higher-wage workers are unlike 
ly to adjust hours as readily as they would if benefits were not tied to full-time employment.) 
7 With the exception of work by Atrostic (1982), little is known about the magnitude of labor 
supply responses to changes in nonwage benefits. Atrostic's work suggests that changes in non- 
wage benefits have a larger effect on labor supply than do changes in the wage.
8. For two reasons, the effect of mandating (with a public sponsor) on labor-supply would prob 
ably be small. First, many potential low-wage workers are (and would be) covered by another 
family member's employer-provided benefits, as Table 1 demonstrated Accordingly, many potential 
participants in the low-wage labor market are insensitive to the provision of health insurance. 
Second, the creation of a public sponsor to provide health insurance to anyone who remains unin 
sured would reduce the advantages of obtaining a job that provided health insurance.
9. Note that there is no guarantee that the wage reduction will exactly offset the cost of the newly 
provided health benefits, as some have contended. Only if the labor supply response were pro 
portional to a labor demand reduction that precisely offsets the costs of mandated benefits would 
a dollar-for-dollar tradeoff between wages and health insurance occur
10. In terms of the model, the price (p) of an input that can be substituted for higher-wage labor 
has increased For evidence on substitution between various groups of labor, see Hamermesh (1986). 
11 How many employers would actually participate in the Small Employer Pool is an important 
topic for further research. There is relatively little work on the reasons for employer participation 
in government programs, the paper by Ashenfelter (1978) being an important exception.
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